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Abstract
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade
unions, the central bank and the scal policymaker. We explicitly
model unionsconcern for public expenditure, paving the way for an
analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the scal pol-
icymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts
that have characterized economic policies in a number of European
countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly
di¤erent incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as
the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The for-
mer has unambiguously induced more e¢ cient outcomes; the latter is
likely to backre!
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the
central bank and the scal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unions
concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential
gains from cooperation between the scal policymaker and the trade unions,
i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic
policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. Following
Burda (1997), we dene corporatism as a set of rules of the game, i.e. in-
stitutional arrangements that involve negotiation, bargaining, collaboration,
and accord between major economic groupings in a society, and especially
between unions and governments. Thus corporatism provides the commit-
ment technology necessary to enforce cooperative agreements between the
trade unions and the scal policymaker.
In their golden age (the 1970s and early 1980s) social pacts sought to trade
wage moderation for higher public expenditure (namely welfare expenditure)
or lower ination (namely after the oil shocks).1 Earlier empirical studies
pointed out that corporatist economies post better performance in terms of
ination and unemployment (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988) but higher levels
of taxation. In recent decades there have been rather conspicuous changes
in European industrial relations. Since 1987, when the rst of ve multi-
annual pacts was stipulated in Ireland, there have been numerous formal or
informal agreements of a corporatist nature in almost all European countries,
with the major exceptions of Belgium and France. But the social pacts of the
last fteen years di¤er from earlier ones in at least one important respect,
since they establish reductions rather than increases in public expenditure
and government action to protect employment and labor rights (Regini, 1997;
Visser, 2002). Some contributions (Streek, 1998; Hancké and Rhodes, 2005)
suggest that second-generation social pacts were induced by the need to meet
the Maastricht criteria. Hancké and Rhodes (2005) also point out that social
pacts disappeared after 1999.
We revisit the case for corporatist agreements in a model where labor
markets are unionized, the government controls the scal stance, and an
independent central bank sets monetary policy. We can then analyze the
scope for a political exchange between public expenditure and wage setting
choices, showing that corporatism may generate quite di¤erent macroeco-
nomic outcomes from the traditional exchange between wage restraint and
high public expenditure. In fact our model can easily encompass both rst
1Unionized labor markets and a pervasive welfare system have long been the hallmark
of European corporatist economies (OECD, 1997; Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Rhodes, 2001;
van Poeck and Borghijs, 2001).
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and second-generation corporatist agreements.
Our approach stands in sharp contrast with some contributions where
the importance of institutional arrangements in shaping macroeconomic out-
comes is a key ingredient, but the focus is restricted to unilateral institutional
constraints on policymakers. Typically, central bank conservatism and insti-
tutional constraints on scal discretion are deemed to generate lower output
distortions and ination (see, for instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
and Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). These results are obtained neglecting strate-
gic interactions between non-atomistic wage setters and policymakers. In this
paper we reconsider the issue and show that trade unions di¤erentially react
to institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, SGP henceforth. To the extent that unions saw bene-
ts from joining EMU, the conditionality of the Maastricht criteria favored
agreements that disciplined wage claims and public expenditures, whereas
the unilateral scal commitment implied by the SGP apparently wipes o¤
incentives for virtuous social pacts and is likely to have adverse e¤ects on
wage setting behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model. In
section 3 we derive the non-cooperative solution. In section 4 we compare
the outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative regimes and derive a num-
ber of propositions on the desirable e¤ects of social pacts. In section 5 we
explain the shifts from rst to second-generation social pacts, with particular
emphasis on the potential role of the Maastricht Treaty. Section 6 highlights
the dangers of unilateral scal retrenchments such as the SGP. Section 7
concludes.
2 The model
We extend an otherwise standard Barro and Gordon model to account for
monetary-scal policy interactions and for policy-endogenous real wage set-
ting. Thus our approach is di¤erent from the one adopted in dynamic New
Keynesian models, where both policymakers and wage setters maximize the
utility of a representative agent. The rationale for this choice is twofold. On
the one hand, we follow a string of contributions that treat labour unions as
institutions whose choices are driven by political economy considerations
that are di¢ cult to include in a simple macromodel (Oswald, 1982; Saint
Paul, 2000; for an extensive survey, see Cukierman, 2004).2 On the other
2It should be noted, however, that in our setting the policymakers optimize quadratic
objective functions. These may be thought of as second-order approximation to a repre-
sentative agent utility function.
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hand, the rich dynamic structure of New Keynesian models makes them un-
suitable for the analysis of strategic interactions between policymakers and
wage setters. In fact, this whole strand of literature has little to say about
long-term ination typically assumed to be zero despite overwhelming evi-
dence of the contrary (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2005: 52).
The standard supply function is dened as follows3
x =    e   t  ~x (1)
where output deviations from the competitive non-distortionary baseline
level, x, are caused by an index of tax distortions, t, real wage distortions
due to monopolistic unions, ~x,4 and ination surprises,    e (e denes
ination expectations).
In this economy there are three players: the government, a monopoly
trade union, and the central bank.
The governments loss function is dened over ination, output and public
expenditure deviations from the target, g   ~g:
G =
1
2

f
2 + x2 + gf (g   ~g)2
	
(2)
As in Debelle and Fischer (1994), ~g is interpreted as the optimal share
of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes were available. In setting the public expenditures level, the
government faces a balanced budget constraint:5
g = t (3)
The trade unions loss function is
U =  ~x~x +
x2
2
+
gu(g   ~g)2
2
(4)
The unions welfare increases with the real wage but falls with output
distortions (see Lawler, 2000a, 2000b; Cukierman, 2004).6 The assumption
3Equation (1) is akin to Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998). For a derivation, see Appendix A.
4More precisely, ex is the real wage mark-up over the competitive wage rate.
5For the sake of simplicity we abstract from both the seigniorage component of the
budget and debt service payments.
6In the literature it is sometimes assumed that the union penalizes real wage deviations
from an exogenous real wage target. This would cause minor changes in our results. See
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004) for a discussion on the di¤erent specications of the
union loss function.
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that the trade union is concerned with expenditure deviations from the target
is perhaps less straightforward and requires some discussion. In fact union
members may be concerned with specic components of public expenditures,
such as pension funds, unemployment benets, health insurance for workers,
social policies, and any government action in the area of income distribu-
tion. For simplicity, we can say that the union is interested in the level of
total government expenditure. In addition, we assume that the monopolis-
tic union sets the labor market distortion, i.e. a real-wage mark-up over
the competitive rate. If we accept a social welfare perspective of the gov-
ernments preferences, the loss functions (2) and (4) will di¤er insofar as the
government takes the preferences of non-workers into account (as in Beetsma
and Bovenberg, 1998).7
Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (CB hence-
forth), which is interested in minimizing both the ination rate and output
deviations from a non-distortionary equilibrium.
V =
1
2

m
2 + x2
	
(5)
where m > f . We assume that the CB directly controls the ination
rate.
3 The non-cooperative solution
The timing of the game is as follows.8 The union and the government simul-
taneously set labor (~x) and tax (t) distortions. After that, the CB chooses
monetary policy, i.e. sets ination ().9 The model is solved by backward
induction. In Appendix C we extend our results to the case where the gov-
ernment action follows the union wage-setting decision. A graphical charac-
terization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided below (gures 1-3).
7For the sake of simplicity we assume that the public expenditure targets in equations
(2) and (4) are identical. This assumption has only quantitative e¤ects on our results
(proof available upon request).
8In this class of models, the timing of the game is not univocally dened. We consider
the two types of non-cooperative games (Nash and Stackelberg with the union leader)
that are more commonly used (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; Beetsma and Bovenberg,
2000, 2002; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; Debelle and Fischer, 1994; Dixit and Lambertini,
2001, 2003). New Keynesian models typically assume that the scal policymaker chooses
his policy instrument taking wages and prices as given (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007;
Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis, 2006; Benigno and Woodford, 2003).
9As usual in this kind of models, setting money supply growth is equivalent to choosing
ination.
5
The CBs reaction function is easily derived by minimizing equation (5)
subject to equation (2):
 =
1
1 + m
fe + t+ ~xg (6)
Taking account of the balanced budget constraint (3) and of equations
(1) and (6), the government rst order condition is
f ()
@
@t
+ x

@x
@t
+
@x
@
@
@t

+ gf (g   ~g) = 0 (7)
where @x
@t
+ @x
@
@
@t
=  1 + 1
1+m
.
When choosing the scal stance, the government anticipates the CBs
reaction to its tax policy, such that ination will increase following a rise in
the tax rate. However, the government cannot internalize the simultaneous
reaction of the trade union. Thus, as explained in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998), taxes will be set as if the ination response could partly o¤set output
distortions, neglecting the wage-setting reaction to taxation.
Let us now turn to unions behavior. The log-deviation of the nominal
wage from its competitive zero-ination level is w = ~x+ e (for a derivation,
see Appendix A). We assume that the trade union takes g as given and simul-
taneously chooses ination expectations and the level of ~x, where the latter
minimizes (4),10 subject to (1) and (6). By imposing rational expectations
e =  (i.e. @x=@~x =  1), we obtain the trade union rst order condition:
 ~x   x = 0 (8)
Corresponding Nash outcomes are:
xN =  ~x (9)
~xN = ~x

1 +
1
gf

f + 
2
m
m + 2m

  ~g (10)
 
~g   gN = ~x
gf

f + 
2
m
m + 2m

(11)
N =
~x
m
(12)
10This implies that the union bargains over the real wage. In the literature it is some-
times assumed that unions bargain over the nominal wage. This issue is not relevant here
because, as Lippi (2002) shows, the two assumptions may have di¤erent implications only
if the number of unions is greater than one.
6
Output distortions are policy invariant (see eq. (9)): given the tax rate,
the trade union will set the real wage distortion at a level such that (8)
holds. As a consequence, labor and tax distortions are perfect substitutes:
the output e¤ect of a tax change is fully o¤set by a real wage adjustment in
the opposite direction (see eq. (10)). We cannot rule out the case where the
government chooses to subsidize production (gN < 0). In this case the union
neutralizes the e¤ects of a subsidy by increasing labor distortions. The more
the union is concerned with the real wage objective, the lower is the tax rate
(eq. (11)). Our results stand in sharp contrast with those obtained in models
where labor market distortions are exogenous. First of all, these models see
subsidies as a remedy to labor market distortions (Alesina and Tabellini,
1987; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). In fact, instead of raising production,
our model shows that the expectation of a subsidy would trigger a real wage
increase. Second, the expenditure bias identied in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998) has no impact on output distortions, which are independent of scal
policy.
4 The cooperative solution
The Nash equilibrium implies three sources of ine¢ ciency related to the tim-
ing of the game and the existence of externalities. First, the government
cannot internalize the impact of its actions on ination expectations. Sec-
ond, the government does not internalize the real wage reaction, such that
in equilibrium @x
@t
= 0. Third, the trade union neglects the adverse e¤ects of
its actions on the level of public expenditure.
As usual, cooperation is dened as the joint minimization of a convex
combination of the di¤erence between the two playersloss functions and their
outside options, i.e. the generalized Nash product
 
G GN  U   UN(1 )
with  2 [0; 1]. For our purposes, a graphical analysis is exhaustive.11
To begin with, it is useful to identify the two playerspreferred combina-
tion of expenditure gap and output.12 For the government, this is:
11It is worth noticing that a closed-form solution of the cooperative case cannot be
derived. Only numerical simulations are possible. The reason is that the maximization of
the Nash product leads to a high-order equation. The alternative would be to consider
the maximization of a utilitarian function or a logarithmic transformation of the Nash
product, but these transformations are tricky in our context since they do not consider
the problem of the feasibility of the cooperative solution (see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo
2007; and Acocella et al. 2008 for details).
12See Appendix B for a derivation. We focus on gaps to have an immediate intuition of
the impact on the loss functions of the players.
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~g   gGSB = 
2
mgf
f + 2m (1 + gf )
~g (13)
xGSB =   gf
2
m
f + 2m (1 + gf )
(14)
Conditions (13) and (14) imply that ~x = 0. Moreover, they are obtained
by requiring the policymaker to take into account the adverse e¤ect of taxes
on ination expectations.
The trade unions preferred combination of expenditure gap and output
is:  
~g   gUSB = ~x
gu
(15)
xUSB = xN =  ~x (16)
gUSB is determined by the union desired trade-o¤ between public expendi-
tures and the real wage. Note that the Nash equilibrium leads to a level of
output too low for the government, i.e. xGSB > xN , but we cannot say a
priori what is the relative magnitude of
 eg   gGSB,  ~g   gUSB,  ~g   gN.
For our analysis of social pacts, it is useful to distinguish the following
cases:  
~g   gUSB <  ~g   gN , i:e: gN < gUSB (17)
 
~g   gN <  ~g   gUSB , i:e: gN > gUSB (18)
irrespectively of the relative size of gGSB.
Suppose condition (17) holds. Both the government and the union ben-
et from
 eg   gC <  ~g   gN, i.e. gN < gC , where superscript C identies
cooperative outcomes. In gure 1, the loci RG and RU identify the combi-
nations of output distortions and expenditure gap that obtain along the two
playersreaction functions, and points , 
 dene the outcomes13 preferred
by the government and by the trade union respectively (their second-best
outcomes). Points N and S identify the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
With regard to the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is worth noting that the union
13Note that point  must lie above the locus RG because in  the government inter-
nalizes the adverse e¤ect of taxes on ination expectations and chooses a lower level of
public expenditure (see Appendix B for a discussion).
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now internalizes the trade o¤ between the real wage mark-up and public ex-
penditure. Therefore its ability to commit to a real wage distortion leads
to a better economic performance relative to the Nash equilibrium. Further
benets accrue from cooperation. In fact cooperative equilibria, e.g. point
C in gure 1,14 entail a reduction both in output distortions and the public
expenditure gap. This, in turn, implies that the trade union is willing to
discipline wage claims in order to benet from an increase in expenditure.
Figure 1
Suppose condition (18) holds. Both the Stackelberg and the cooperative
solutions are then substantially modied (see gure 2). With regard to the
Stackelberg equilibrium, the unions ability to internalize the trade o¤ be-
tween the real wage mark-up and public expenditure causes an increase in
output distortions relative to the Nash equilibrium. This happens because
the trade union is now less interested in public expenditures. By contrast,
cooperation brings output distortions below the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2
Summarizing, our model is consistent with both the old and the new forms
of social pacts. Any cooperative agreement entails a reduction in output
distortions and an increase in employment. If
 
~g   gUSB <  ~g   gN, the
government will agree to reduce the public expenditure gap (i.e., it will raise
public expenditure) in exchange for wage moderation as in the golden age
social pacts. By contrast, if
 
~g   gUSB >  ~g   gN ; the government agrees
on a reduction in public expenditure, as all cooperative solutions must lie in
the feasibility set indicated in gure 2.
5 Explaining the shift from rst- to second-
generation social pacts
According to our model, the observed shift to second-generation pacts is
possible only if condition (18) holds, that is, if
~x
gu
>
~x
gf
f + 
2
m
m + 2m
(19)
14We take the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the playersoutside option of the
cooperative Nash solution in gure 1. When the union is the game leader with respect
to the government, the feasibility set has to be computed by considering the Stackelberg
solution as the outside option
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In the light of eq. (19) we can discuss the potential role of some facts
which might have inuenced the evolution of social pacts.
 Fall in union militancy. There is evidence that union militancy began
to fall in the 80s (see Visser, 2000), potentially disciplining wage claims
and inducing the unions to accept a reduction in public expenditure.
In our model parameter ~x characterizes union militancy; hence from
(19) it is clear that this would not change the nature of the political
exchange between the unions and the policymaker.
 Political change. In many European countries right-wing governments
came to power in the early Nineties (Swank, 1999). Furthermore, Pi-
azza (2001) argues that the remaining left-wing governments became
less radical, partly due to the generalized fall in union militancy. This
could have reduced governmentsconcern for public expenditures and
thus one of the terms of social pacts.15 In our framework variations
in gf 16 can capture the impact of the political cycle on the nature of
social pacts. It is easy to see that a fall in gf , i.e. a political shift to
the right, per se makes condition (19) less likely to obtain.
 Central Bank commitment to low ination. There is a widespread con-
sensus (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998) that in the 80s Central Banks adopted
a more conservative stance. In our model, the monetary policy reaction
to scal and labour market distortions a¤ects the scal policymaker de-
cision to levy distortionary taxes. As discussed in section 3, this is the
Beetsma and Bovenberg e¤ect, captured by changes in m. From con-
dition (19), it is easy to see that an increase in conservatism can reduce 
~g   gN only if m < f +q2f + f .17
 Maastricht criteria. Second-generation social pacts became more nu-
merous in the early 1990s, after stipulation of the Maastricht Treaty,
when admission to EMU was made conditional to fullment of certain
prerequisites entailing monetary policy independence, ination control
15See also Alvarez et al. (1991), Baccaro and Lim (2007) and Hamann and Kelly (2007).
16Alternatively, we might assume that the government is characterized by a relatively
lower public expenditure target. The results would be qualitatively identical.
17The non linear e¤ect of a change in m is explained as follows. On the one hand,
according to the Beetsma and Bovenberg e¤ect, the government anticipates an accommo-
dating monetary response on output. Therefore an increase in conservatism disciplines
expenditures. On the other hand, the accommodating monetary policy response has an
adverse e¤ect on ination. Therefore an increase in conservatism lowers the ination costs
of higher public expenditures.
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and scal discipline (Fajertag and Pochet, 2000; Hancke and Rhodes,
2005). It is widely acknowledged that the Treaty enhanced the low-
ination commitment of many European central banks and disciplined
governments. A similar conclusion should hold for wage-setting be-
havior, to the extent that unions members saw benets from EMU.18
Assuming that this was indeed the case, in the following we investigate
whether trade union attitude towards EMU membership can explain
second-generation social pacts.
In our framework the role of the Maastricht criteria is mimicked by adding
linear penalties in ination and public expenditure19 to (2), (4):
G =
1
2

f
2 + x2 + gf (g   ~g)2
	
+ EU  + 
EU
gu g (20)
U =  ~x~x +
x2
2
+
gu(g   ~g)2
2
+ 
EU
 + EUgu g (21)
We thus consider additional costs associated to the variables relevant for
the criteria achievement as an indirect indicator of the cost of not joining the
EMU. The rationale for such penalties is intuitive for the government. Our
key assumption is then that also unions perceive benets from joining EMU:
equation (21) captures the idea that unions internalize the link between wage
setting behavior, fulllment of the Maastricht criteria and, thus, the chances
of accession to EMU.20
Solving the model for the Nash equilibrium yields:
xNMA = xN +
EU
m
(22)
~xNMA = ~xN  

1 +
f + 
2
m
gf (m + 2m)

EU
m
+
EU
gf (1 + m)
+
EUgu
gf
(23)
18Consider for instance the welfare gains outlined in the Cecchini report (see Cecchini,
1988). For an alternative justication see Whyman (2002).
19The Maastricht criteria required public decit control. To the extent that this put
pressure for a reduction in public spending, in our static framework it seems appropriate
to assume that this raised the cost of attaining a certain level of public expenditure.
Buti (2007) shows that "several countries combined discretionary cuts in spending with a
reduction in tax revenue, thus reducing the overall size of the public sector" (Buti, 2006:
7).
20The union ination aversion is a debated issue, since it is considered as an ad hoc
assumption by many authors (e.g. Soskice and Iversen, 2000). It is worth noting that here
the union does not care about ination per se: unions onlycare about ination in so far
as low ination raises the chances of joining EMU.
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~g   gNMA =  ~g   gN+ 1
gf

EU
1 + m
+ EUgu  
EU
m
f + 
2
m
m + 2m

(24)
NMA = N   
EU

2m
(25)
Relative to pre-Maastricht Nash equilibria, output distortions and ina-
tion unambiguously fall. Trade unions concern for EMU membership is cru-
cial to support this outcome: xNMA = xN and NMA = N when EU = 0.
21
By contrast, the Maastricht criteria have an ambiguous impact on the public
expenditure gap (equation 24). On the one hand, the scal stance is tighter
because the policymaker sees more costs from increases in ination and public
expenditures. On the other hand, trade unions are induced to choose a lower
level of output distortions for any level of public expenditures (see equation
(22)), and greater wage discipline leaves room for a looser scal policy.
The post-Maastricht trade unions preferred combination of output and
expenditure gap is given by (22) and by:
 
~g   gUSBMA =  ~g   gUSB+ EUgu
gu
(26)
This implies that, relative to pre-Maastricht cooperative agreements, co-
operation unambiguously entails a reduction in output distortions, whereas
the e¤ect on public expenditure is uncertain. Cooperative agreements would
take the form of second-generation pacts only if
 
~g   gUSBMA > ~g  gNMA.
This, in turn, requires that
EUgu
gu
+
1
gf

EU
m
f + 
2
m
m + 2m
  
EU

1 + m
  EUgu

>    ~g   gUSB   ~g   gN
(27)
where it is obviously assumed that (17) holds, i.e.
 
~g   gUSB   ~g   gN <
0.
The l.h.s. of (27) identies the di¤erential impact that the Maastricht
criteria have on
 
~g   gUSBMA and ~g   gNMA, conrming the intuition that
second-generation pacts would have emerged only if the Maastricht criteria
21In the Nash equilibrium coe¢ cient EUgu in (21) is obviously irrelevant. It would play
an important role when the trade union plays Stackelberg leader vis à vis the government.
Results available upon request.
12
had a relatively strong impact on trade unions.22 Note that if in equation
(24) the expenditure gap falls, i.e.

EU
m
f+
2
m
m+2m
  EU
1+m
  EUgu

> 0, then
condition (27) is more likely to hold. This leads to an intriguing and perhaps
surprising conjecture. Without cooperation, the Maastricht criteria might
have failed to discipline scal policies even though both unions and scal
policymakers recognized the importance of joining EMU. This, in turn, led
to the emergence of social pacts aiming at public expenditure control.23
6 The danger of unilateral scal retrenchments:
Could the SGP backre?
Earlier contributions (see Sibert, 1999; Sibert and Sutherland, 2000) have
pointed out that, while policymakers where unambiguously disciplined by
the conditionality of the Maastricht Treaty, national scal policies would
turn to a loose stance after EMUmembership was obtained, unless additional
constraints were imposed on the scal policymakers. Moreover, an extensive
literature supports the view that institutional constraints on the scal stance
improve macroeconomic performance,24 providing a rationale for the Stability
and Growth Pact. In these contributions trade unionsbehavior is usually
neglected or assumed to be exogenous. In this section we show that such an
assumption is not innocuous.
In the following we maintain the single-country framework, even though
the post-EMU process determining ination is substantially di¤erent because
monetary policy is decided by a union-wide central bank. The motivation here
is twofold: i) scal commitment by denition implies that the policymaker
choice is determined irrespective of central bank future actions; ii) ination
does not enter the trade unions objective function.25
22This conclusion is reinforced for countries where commitment to low ination and
scal discipline had already been established. For instance, when m ! 1 condition
(27) requires
EUgu
gu
>
EUgu
gf
.
23Notice that the model as such is not equipped to show whether post-Maastricht social
pacts in fact became more likely. Preliminary empirical evidence shows that this was
indeed the case in countries that eventually joined EMU (Colombo et al., 2008).
24See, among others, Chari and Kehoe (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2000,
2002), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), and Gover-
natori and Eij¢ nger (2004).
25Alternatively, we could have followed other contributions to the literature, where trade
unions are ination averse and the common central bank is characterized by an objective
function which is quadratic in the common ination rate and in a weighted average of
national outputs. It would be easy to show that these extensions would not modify our
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Our analysis is based on the presumption that Maastricht criteria and
the SGP have a profoundly di¤erent inuence on the trade union incentives.
As discussed in section 5, the former leave room for wage setting decisions
to a¤ect outcomes EMU membership  of interest to trade unions. By
contrast, the latter are unilateral decisions undertaken by governments, who
promise to adopt a certain scal stance independently from wage-setting
behavior. Furthermore, the recent history of EMU scal policies shows that
the costs of breaching the SGP rules are mainly reputational and therefore
fall entirely on the scal policymakers. We therefore assume that the unions
objective function (4) is not a¤ected by scal pre-commitment.
The SGP denes decit ceilings. As pointed out in section 5 it seems
plausible that decit control ultimately translates into lower expenditures.
In the following we maintain the assumption that administrative restrictions
on the scal stance are bound to limit the level of public expenditures. In
our model this is equivalent to establishing a oor G for the governments
reaction function, such that ~g   g  G.26 Consider a Nash equilibrium (eq.
(9)). It is easy to see that setting G > ~g   gN would trigger a real wage
increase, leaving output distortions una¤ected.27 Therefore scal constraints
always reduce welfare.
A more complex picture emerges if one considers the case where unions
act as a leader vis à vis the scal policymaker (gure 3).
Figure 3
First, consider the case of an S1-type equilibrium characterized by ~g gS1.
It is easy to see that any G < ~g   gS1 would not bind. By contrast, for any
G > ~g gS1 the constraint is binding but counterproductive. Second, consider
an S2-type equilibrium. The oor is only binding for any G > ~g   gS2,
where output distortions fall to the Nash equilibrium level. This happens
because the union no longer anticipates the trade o¤between wage distortion
and public expenditure gap. However, a commitment to raise expenditures
would exert an identical disciplining e¤ect on the union, but with a lower
expenditure gap! In fact, the optimal constraint is a ceiling on the public
expenditure gap, such that Gceil = max f0; ~g   ~xg.28
conclusions about the e¤ects of unilateral scal pre-commitment.
26Alternatively, we might assume that, as in section 5, not fullling the SGP requirement
a¤ects the scal policymakers objective function. Our results would not be a¤ected,
because the crucial assumption is the di¤erential impact of the two schemes on the unions
objective function.
27As an example, consider point P in gure 3.
28It would be straightforward to show that this result obtains minimizing the Govern-
ment loss function subject to the constraints x =  ~x and ~x  0.
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7 Concluding remarks
The impact of endogenous wage setting on macroeconomic performance can-
not be neglected in European countries. We have shown that cooperation
between the unions and the governments can improve economic performance
and the positions of the parties. The rst key to our results lies in the con-
sideration that unions may be interested in the level of public expenditure,
in addition to the traditional objectives, i.e. the real wage rate and em-
ployment. The second key lies in our re-examination of corporatism as a
feasible set of institutional arrangements designed to internalize certain neg-
ative macroeconomic externalities. The third key is the characterization of
the government budget as a two-faced Janus, i.e. its double role of providing
public expenditure valuable for union members and extracting distortionary
taxes. The fourth key is the emphasis on the profoundly di¤erent incentives
generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria, on
the one hand, and the Stability and Growth Pact, on the other. This latter
result is entirely due to our endogeneization of the wage setting process.
Our analysis has signicant implications for the current debate on insti-
tutional reforms in Europe. Discussion of the reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact fails to consider its impact on labor market performance. Our
paper suggests that when the interdependence between scal policy and the
labor market is considered, any strategy of unilaterally placing a cap on pub-
lic expenditure is doomed to be counterproductive. In one case a commit-
ment to raise expenditures would even be preferable to a restrictive ceiling!
By contrast, corporatist institutions should be regarded as valuable tools
in enhancing macroeconomic performance, in line with the Lisbon Strategy
approach, which emphasizes the role of social partnership.
Some authors see the commitment to scal restraint as a catalyst for la-
bor market reforms that should reduce the power of unions. In this vein,
the complete liberalization of the labor market would be a complementary
solution to the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the risks should be
clear. On the one hand, the Calmfors and Dri¢ lls hump-shape curve sug-
gests that corporatist agreements are likely to dominate partial labor market
liberalization. On the other hand, complete deregulation may be politically
unfeasible.
Regarding future developments of this article, there are at least three in-
teresting possible lines of research. First, the impact of globalization on the
social pact through the open economy channel, which ambiguously a¤ects the
incentive for social pacts; in particular, we expect international scal and
wage externalities to have opposite e¤ects on the incentives to cooperate, as
part of the cost of implementing the pact is put on the rest of the world.
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Second, creation of a monetary union reduces the size of the representative
union and thus, probably, increases the incentive to free riding, making social
pact less likely to be observed. Finally, we have in fact not investigated the
role of di¤erent public expenditure targets as between the union and the gov-
ernment or of specic components of public expenditure. The former indeed
would most likely simply generate a shift in our results and only make them
more di¢ cult to interpret. By contrast, we expect that consideration of the
e¤ects on the labor market of di¤erent specic components of public expen-
diture could provide new important insights. However these would be beyond
the scope of our current research.
Appendix A Derivation of output equation
The representative price-taking rm maximizes its net prot:
P (1  )Y  WL (A1)
where Y = La is the production function, P and W respectively dene the
price and wage levels, and  is the sales-tax rate.
The standard rst order condition is:
P (1  )La 1 = W (A2)
The next step is the denition of the nominal wage rate which obtains in
a unionized labour market:
W = WC
 
1 + U

P e (A3)
where WC is the exogenous real wage that would obtained in a competitive
labour market,
 
1 + U

denes the real wage mark-up over the competitive
rate, P e is the expected price level.29 Taking logs, we get
y =
a
1  a [p  t  w
c   ~x  pe] + a
1  a ln a (A4)
where ~x = ln
 
1 + U

, t =   ln (1  ). Dening y = a
1 a ( wc + ln a) as
the non-distorted real output, and normalizing at 1 the previous period price
level, we can rewrite the above equation as:
x = (   e   ~x  t) (A5)
29In this class of models wages are pre-determined w.r.t. prices; thus nominal wages are
set conditionally to the price level expectation.
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where x =
 
a
1 a
 1
(y   y)
To derive the government balanced budget equation (3) start from
Y = GEXP (A6)
where GEXP denes the level of government expenditures. Straightforward
manipulations show that
(1  ) =

1  GEXP
Y

(A7)
Hence, setting g =   ln  1  GEXP
Y

, equation (3) obtains.
Appendix B Figure outcomes
In this appendix we derive the iso-losses and reaction functions depicted in
the gures (i.e. in the space (x; g   ~g)).
The unions iso-loss curves are directly obtained from equation (4) by
using (1), (3) and the rational expectations constraint:
U = ~x (x+ g) +
x2
2
+
gu(g   eg)2
2
The governments iso-loss is:
G(x; g   ~g) = 1
2

f
2m
+ 1

x2 + gf (g   ~g)2

and its reaction function is:
~g   g =   f + 
2
m
(1 + m)mgf
x
since @x
@g
= @
@t
  1 = 1
1+m
  1 =   m
1+m
.
The unions preferred combination of output and expenditure gap is:

 =

 ~x;
~x
gu

Similarly for the government we obtain:
 = f0; ~gg
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which is however unfeasible since it implies ~x =  ~g. By considering the
additional constraint ~x  0 (i.e.~g   g > x + ~g), the governments preferred
combination of outcomes and expenditure gap is:
 =

  gf
2
m
f + 2m (1 + gf )
~g;
2mgf
f + 2m (1 + gf )
~g

implying a labor distortion equal to zero (~x = 0). It is easy to verify that
 lays above the governments reaction function. This happens for reasons
discussed in the text.
Appendix C Stackelberg solution
The non-cooperative Stackelberg solution is derived as follows. From (1),
(6), (7) we obtain the scal policymakers reaction function
t =
gf (1 + m)
2 ~g   (f + a2m) (~x+ e)
2m + af + (1 + m)
2 gf
Imposing rational expectations, it is then straightforward to show that the
trade unions loss function (4) is minimized by
~x =
[f + 
2
m + gfm (1 + m)]

f + 
2
m + gf (1 + m)
2
2m
2
gf (1 + m)
2 + gu (
2
m + f )
2 ~x   ~g
The corresponding equilibrium outcomes (point S in the gures) are:30
t = ~g   (f + 
2
m)

f + 
2
m + gf (1 + m)
2
m2gf (1 + m)
3 + gu (
2
m + f )
2 ~x
 =
(1 + m)

(1 + m)
2 gf + 
2
m + f

gf
m2gf (1 + m)
3 + gu (
2
m + f )
2 ~x
x =  (1 + m)

(1 + m)
2 gf + 
2
m + f

mgf
m2gf (1 + m)
3 + gu (
2
m + f )
2 ~x
30It is worth noting that the output distortion associated with the Nash equilibrium
is smaller than that associated with the Stackelberg solution if
gu
gf
<
2m+m
2m+f
. Thus
central banks preferences a¤ect output distortions. In a companion paper we analyze the
optimal degree of conservativeness under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
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